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Newsletter - 9-2006
Why, in Executive Limitation
Policies, Stating Certain Instructions in the Double
Negative is Better Than Converting Them to Prescriptive
Language
A
while back I had a Policy Governance® client whose
attorney took all the executive limitation policies that
were double negatives and converted them to prescriptive
language, removing the double negatives. On the surface
this seemed logical and difficult to defend against. But
as I began to think about it I was troubled, and after
reasoning the structure of the semantics through,
discovered what was bothering me. Later, in visiting
about this with another attorney of a large nonprofit,
she spotted immediately the problem in changing double
negatives to the comparable prescriptive language,
confirming my conclusion. See if you can.
As
those acquainted with Policy Governance know, the Board
policies dealing with organizational means are stated as
proscriptions (prohibitions). This occasionally causes
consternation for people who do not understand the vital
logic behind the proscriptive approach. Delegation
principles and logic lead to the conclusion that the
alternative, i.e., prescriptive language (or using
approvals), regarding means does not result in
assignment of accountability for the consequences, the
results (ends)! The prescriber retains accountability
because he or she stipulated the means as well. Most
understand that principle when it is explained. So, too,
with the use of approvals – accountability remains with
the approver and confuses (at best), mitigates, or
nullifies the accountability of the requester. The only
way to assign accountability for results (and
consequently genuinely empower to create them), whether
by the board or a manager in the organization, is to
assign the desired end(s) and simply indicated the means
that are prohibited.
Furthermore, a fundamental idea in Policy Governance is
that the board concerns or values that are candidates
for these executive limitation policies are candidates
because they are things the board does not want to occur
even if they aid in accomplishing the ends.
On the other hand, legitimate
effective means that one or more board members might
happen to privately wish the CEO would use (although the
board stays out of expressing means) will probably be
already known to the CEO in any case and used or have
been considered for use by management. Nevertheless, as
far as the board is concerned, if the CEO is
accomplishing the ends, (including any ends dealing with
efficiency), and avoiding the executive limitations, the
Board should be pleased. If a board rams means
instructions (prescriptions) down the throat of the CEO,
it retains the accountability for the consequences. (If
a board feels it has to do that, it should consider
either its own arrogance or, alternatively, why it has
that need if the CEO is competent.)
However, in the executive limitation example policies
used to launch policy manuals by hundreds of Policy
Governance boards there are, in fact, a limited number
of instructions that are apparent prescriptions couched
as double negatives. …”the CEO shall not fail to…” These
speak to values imbedded in processes that most boards
would insist upon even if the organization
accomplished its ends without them, (so they fit the
above inclusionary criteria). The temptation for boards
(and some attorneys) is to, logically, convert these
policies to nice clean prescriptions. We are taught in
English class to avoid double negatives.
One
argument for retaining the double negative language is
to maintain policy language consistent with all the
proscriptive language. It is confusing, it is argued, to
read some policies as true proscriptions and then mixed
in are prescriptions. This certainly has validity but
may not be persuasive. However, there is another more
important logical underlying, but less
obvious, reason, for retaining the double negative, and
that is there is a fundamental semantic and
interpretive difference between a double negative and
the comparable prescriptive language.
A
double negative does not necessarily result in
each clause negating the other in a way that
automatically results in the same effect as its
prescriptive form. If we say “do something,” one can
infer that that is precisely what they must do and
nothing more, or at best, it is unclear. If I say
“build me a china cabinet,” it is usually assumed in
linguistics that that is precisely what is desired. The
cabinet maker would be misinterpreting (or going beyond)
the instruction to build a china cabinet that included
space for silverware or tablecloths as well. But if we
said, “Do not fail to build me a china cabinet,” the
semantic implication is that the “inner boundary” of the
instruction is the creation of a china cabinet, but it
is a lower (or minimum) boundary, not an outer
boundary. A reasonable interpretation could include room
for silverware or tablecloths! If we wanted to use a
double negative and restrict the interpretation,
we would say, “do not fail to make me just a
china cabinet.” The fact we immediately see the semantic
difference in these two statements makes the case. The
double negative actually gives greater freedom of
interpretation than the prescription, thus retaining the
original principle of empowerment behind this approach
in the first place.
The
problem with interpreting prescriptive language is
deciding what exactly, or how much, is intended in the
prescription. It invites the need for further detail,
just what we don’t want in delegation that empowers. By
using a double negative, the inner line (those things
required) is defined, while the freedom to enhance is
retained, for example with a personnel manual.
Furthermore, enhancing one’s execution to achieve
compliance pursuant to a reasonable interpretation, when
the line is unclear, is more likely to fully or even
better meet what the person (or board) had in mind in
giving the instruction, a very helpful collateral
consequence. |
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